by Yossi Beilin- Bitterlemons - July 31, 2006
There is a theory that holds that in order to solve a difficult political problem you first need a hard crisis. It argues that without the Yom Kippur War of 1973 there would be no Israeli-Egyptian peace; without the first intifada the Oslo agreement would not have been signed; and so on.
I object to this approach, which is used, usually after the fact, to justify unnecessary wars. The assumption behind it is that we are so stupid that we`ll never learn from history, and that we`ll always have to spill a lot of blood before achieving normalization on this or that front. At the same time, if the hard crisis is in any event upon us I`ll always seek to "exploit" it in the spirit of "now we really must do something", in order to bring about a settlement. This is precisely the situation in the Gaza Strip.
These days in particular, with the international community striving for a ceasefire in our region, it is important to separate the southern and northern fronts. There is no reason for Hizballah to become the patron of the Palestinians by sponsoring a comprehensive ceasefire. An agreement in the south should, in my opinion, come first.
It should comprise the following components: release of the soldier Gilead Shalit; cessation of all hostile activity (rocket firing, terrorism, and penetration of sovereign Israeli territory by tunneling and other means); cessation of Israel`s military operation in the Gaza Strip; cessation of Israeli artillery fire on the Strip; cessation of Israeli targeted assassinations; and ensuring the proper administration of the Gaza passages with Egypt in accordance with the agreement reached through the intervention of the US secretary of state. At a later stage, as these phases are implemented, Israel will release the Palestinian prisoners it intended to free in accordance with the understandings between PM Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas, and will cease to oppose the delivery of economic aid to the Palestinian Authority.
The signing of such an agreement is likely to produce additional benefits. Until a month ago, the Palestinians were engaged in internal discussions about setting up a national unity government based on the amended prisoners` document. The document itself is entirely for internal purposes and cannot form the basis of any sort of Israeli-Palestinian agreement. But it could now enable the establishment of a joint government, with Abbas remaining at the head and ministers from Fateh and other factions serving in it. Israel has an interest in the emergence of a new and significant point of contact with the Palestinians; under the changing circumstances, a Palestinian unity government could fulfill that function.
The next phase could be the opening of talks between Israel and the PLO regarding an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. If indeed Olmert is prepared to withdraw from 90 percent, it will be necessary to coordinate the security and civilian aspects of the pullout and to agree to treat it as implementation of phase II of the roadmap and as the third further redeployment that was stipulated in the 1995 interim agreement we never completely carried out. In parallel with withdrawal, or at the latest upon its completion, negotiations would begin over an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement. The underlying principles of the agreement would be established at this point in accordance with President George W. Bush`s "vision", the roadmap and additional principles, with the knowledge that the negotiations would be limited in time.
If and when these negotiations lead to agreement, both sides would seek its approval by popular referendum. In this way each side would know that its fellow signatory to the agreement represents the broad public rather than a passing government coalition. If one or both of the publics rejects the agreement it would become invalid. In this way, neither side would take upon itself uncalculated risks when the agreement is signed.
In the present constellation, when the prime minister of Israel is prepared to give up nearly all of the West Bank without any Palestinian quid pro quo and the leader of the Palestinian people is one of the most pragmatic persons among them and is identified with opposition to violent struggle, it would be a mistake of historic proportions not to grab the bull by the horns. It is time to make a serious effort to do something more courageous and more worthwhile than maintaining the status quo or carrying out another unilateral withdrawal, particularly when the risks of such a move have become increasingly obvious in recent weeks.- Published 31/7/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org
Member of Knesset Yossi Beilin is chair of the Meretz-Yahad party.
