Walid Salem - 28/12/2006

            When Tony Blair the Prime Minister of Britain was visiting the Palestinian President Mahmmoud Abbas (Abu-Mazen) in Ramallah in 18/12/2006, he suggested a “Partial Israeli withdrawal from West Bank for a Palestinian Hudna” (Stoppage of hostilities) for a limited period. Few days after the media published the new initiative of Ahmed Yousef the Political Advisor of the Palestinian Prime Minister Ismael Hanniyyah which was agreed upon with British, Norwegian and Swiss envoys. That initiative includes a proposal for Israeli partial withdrawal from West Bank, while the Palestinians will be committed to a five years Hudna with Israel. Upon that one would question if Mr. Alaister Croak the British organizer of the mentioned initiative with Ahmed Yousef was doing that on his personal capacity, or in full coordination with the British Government?

While the Arabic and Islamic countries decided to lift the sanctions imposed on the Palestinian Hamas led government, some European countries did the same; also the European “Track II” was accelerated with Hamas in coordination with the European high policy makers. Two driving assumptions were behind this European move: one is that Hamas represent the growing power among Palestinians and that can deliver peace with Israel, and the second that a work should be done with Hamas on the political issues in order to help the Palestinian Presidential Abu-Mazen move ahead in the peace process.

These two mentioned driving assumptions are not the same of course: The first work for helping Hamas to become the alternative to the PLO and the Palestinian Presidential in every thing including in the political peace process, and the second is still assuming that PLO and the president Abu-Mazen should continue to be in charge of the Peace process. The difference between these two assumptions is like the difference between some European countries who moved already to the first assumption, and Tony Blair who wanted to use Alistair Croak initiative in order to help Abu-Mazen move along, supported on that by the new American initiative for peace in three stages beginning with the implementation of Sharm Asheikh Sharon-Abu Mazen understandings of 8/2/2005, followed by the establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, then negotiate about the permanent status resolution. The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livini is reported to be initiating also the same political plan of three stages.

With that all said it look like politically that the previous Israeli plan to get a “Palestinian state with Provisional Borders” through “Unilateral realignment” as it was called by Prime Minister Ihud Olmert, is replaced now by a plan to get to the same “State” but through agreement and coordination. Hamas approval (despite their denial) of that is already secured through Ahmed Yousef – Alistair Croak initiative. But still there are two questions: The First: What will be the position of Abu-Mazen about such a plan, and what is the difference of his and Hamas’s political offer? And the second: How things will move ahead with this growing contradiction between the official American Israeli-British line of doing things with Abu-Mazen, and the other of some European countries and Track II Israelis and Europeans of doing things gradually with Hamas as an alternative leadership to the Palestinians? Will this contradiction help the process move along, or it will make it all collapse because of the growing tension among the Palestinians themselves as a result of internal competitions between Hamas and Fateh and that is promoted also by the mentioned international contradiction?

When it comes to Abu-Mazen, the observer would see that he (officially speaking) rejects the idea of “state with Provisional Borders” with the fear that it might become a final solution, but in second hand he offers Israel his idea of two states that recognize each other and live in peace and harmony. This of course is different than Hamas new proposal of Ahmed Yousef giving Israel a Hudna for five years for partial withdrawal from West Bank while the issue of recognition of Israel is still to be considered later on, while no guarantee that this recognition might come along. Therefore Israel has two offers from the Palestinian side: One of final status solution as soon as possible with full recognition of Israel, and the second a temporary Hudna without recognition.

The complexity became clearer when one will notice the two lines of thinking in the Israeli politics, the one that is prevailing and analyzing that a permanent status agreement is not yet possible with Abu-Mazen, because the negotiations with him on that status will be stuck again with the issues of refugees and Jerusalem the same as happened with Yasser Arafat in camp David, therefore it is better for Israel to go for conflict management and not conflict resolution with the Palestinians, including through negotiating partial Hudna with Hamas, with the hope that during the Hudna time the situation will become ripe for a political solution, also Israel will gain more time in order to create more facts on the ground in West Bank the way that serves the Israeli interests.

The second opinion in Israel from the left wing organizations is that one that call for a permanent agreement ASAP with Abu-Mazen, and to implement it in two to three years time the utmost.

The first position risk the issues of recognition of Israel, but at the same time hope that Hamas will make the same move Fateh made in the direction of recognizing Israel, but in shorter time. With this idea they help develop Hamas to become the alternative of PLO in the leadership of the Palestinians. While the second position looks for shifting radically the discourse of the relations between the two peoples, which will result by giving Abu-Mazen more ground on the expense of Hamas on the basis that the Palestinian people will reward him as a successful leader getting them their rights of self determination and Statehood.

Upon these two positions, some Europeans and some Israelis chose to work with Hamas, for temporary arrangements, while the idea of getting to a permanent status agreement ASAP is still without a go ahead signal so far. In between a process for the improvement of the life of the Palestinians was picked through the last meeting of Olmert-Abu Mazen in 23/12/2006. Abu-Mazen from his side rushed to that meeting after he got the news of Hamas political move through Ahmed Yousef initiative, he felt that Hamas is not fulfilling its promises to keep the negotiations as PLO responsibility, also he wanted to rescue his political plan to get permanent status agreement instead of suffering from a new gradual process such that of a “state of provisional borders” as a step towards the final status, instead of going immediately to the final status. In the meeting Abu-Mazen did got something different than what he was looking for, moreover all what he got was mostly “Postponed Promises”: Promise to release Palestinian Prisoners if Gilaad Shalit the Israeli kidnapped soldier in Gaza will be released (Something that is not in the hands of Abu-Mazen), extension of ceasefire to the West Bank if there will be commitment of it in Gaza, release of the Palestinian tax revenues monies if a formula for that will be agreed upon and …etc with the other promises. One point only was valid as an outcome of the meeting: that is the revival of the work of the joint security committee with the participation of Egypt and USA, with a discussion about deploying Abu-Mazen Presidential Guards Units in North Gaza in order to prevent rockets attacks on Israel, and getting more funds and weapons to that Unit, also the bringing of Bader Brigades of the Palestinian Liberation Army from Jordan to Gaza in order to support the Presidential security departments.

With all of these “ifs”, Abu-Mazen will look like as getting nothing, while if the partial withdrawal happens in West Bank with Hamas giving ceasefire in the expense, this will make things look to the Palestinian Public that Hamas through its resistance was the power that is able to oblige Israel to withdraw from West Bank as it did earlier in Gaza Strip and also is the power that can deliver the ceasefire on the expense of that, and not Abu-Mazen.

Therefore the Strength of Abu-Mazen is by getting to a permanent status solution, and not be getting to a new partial solutions that will play only for the side of Hamas. Moreover, these partial moves will be like actually “Burning” Abu-Mazen as it said in Arabic, while you are claiming to support him, leading in other hand to more tension and conflict over power between Fateh and Hamas, something that will not be good for the Palestinians, but also will not be good to the peace process, and reconciliation between the two peoples.