Peace Index: October 2005

Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann

Despite the ongoing and widespread disappointment with Oslo, the prevailing view today is that Yitzhak Rabin’s decision to enter the process was correct, and that the decision was his own rather than forced on him by the circumstances. At the same time, it is generally believed that even if he had not been assassinated and had continued to serve as prime minister, the process Rabin began would not have brought a peace agreement with the Palestinians to this very day.

As for Rabin’s leadership, the prevailing view in the Jewish public is that he was a moderately good leader, with the other opinions divided between those who see him as an outstanding one and those who think he was average or lower as a leader. These assessments jibe with the responses to a question on who, in another fifty years, will be considered the best prime minister Israel had had until then: Rabin came in third,  after Israel’s two mythological leaders David Ben-Gurion and Menachem Begin, and only a little before current prime minister Ariel Sharon.

The percentage of those who think Israeli society has not been changed by the assassination is much larger than the rate of those who think it was changed by it for the better, and also considerably larger than the rate of those who say it was changed for the worse. However, regarding the permeation of the basic ideas of Oslo—and primarily the idea of conceding territories for peace—we find a dominant view that this has become part of the national consensus. At the same time, an overwhelming majority of the Jewish public believes that even if Israel evacuates all the territories beyond the Green Line and the occupation ends, Palestinian violence will not stop and may even intensify.

The deep mistrust of the Palestinians is also evident in views on the current situation. A decisive majority believes Sharon is justified in refusing to meet with Abu Mazen, despite the perception that Abu Mazen wants to prevent terror attacks but is unable to. A clear majority also says that even if Hamas becomes part of the government after the PA elections, it will not moderate its positions toward Israel nor its involvement in terror attacks. There is, however, a division into two more or less equal camps on whether, in such a case, Israel should or should not hold negotiations with the Authority.

Those are the main findings of the Peace Index survey for October 2005, which was carried out on Monday and Tuesday, October 31 and November 1.

A full ten years after Rabin’s murder and with the ongoing violence in Israeli-Palestinian relations, we checked whether, in retrospect, the decision to enter the Oslo process appears sound or mistaken to the Israeli Jewish public. Half the respondents assessed the decision as right, 39% as errant, and the rest did not know. A segmentation according to degree of religiosity (self-rating) shows clearly that the greater the religiosity, the greater the negative assessment of Rabin’s decision on this issue. Whereas 62% of the secular approve of the decision and 26% view it as mistaken, over 70% of the religious and haredi criticize it and only a small minority approves. In the Arab sector the view is much more positive, with 85% in favor and only 10% against (the rest have no opinion).

As for the extent to which the decision to launch Oslo was Rabin’s own initiative or, under the conditions of that period, any prime minister would have acted similarly, about half the Jewish public answered that it was Rabin’s own decision and 34% saw it as an outcome of the circumstances. Among the Arabs the gap is smaller but the direction is similar: 48% credit the decision to Rabin himself and 42% to the exigencies of the hour. However, on whether, if Rabin had not been assassinated and had continue to serve as prime minister, an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement would have been concluded by now, there is a large gap between the two sectors. Among the Jews, the highest proportion—48.5%—answer negatively, while 39% say an agreement would have been signed by now if Rabin had not been killed. Among the Arabs, however, a huge majority of 85.5% think that if he had continued to serve, an Israeli-Palestinian agreement would have been reached by now.

How does the public rate Rabin as a leader in retrospect? The prevailing view—44%—is that he was a moderately good one. Twenty percent see him as an outstanding leader, and about the same number as average. Only a small minority of 8% define Rabin as a moderately poor or failed leader. This positive, though not glowing assessment, tallies with the finding that whereas 31% think that in another 50 years Ben-Gurion will be considered the best prime minister and a similar rate (29%) say so regarding Menachem Begin, only 13% believe Rabin will be considered the best leader and 12% think so about Sharon. One possible explanation for this finding is the time effect, Ben-Gurion and Begin having already entered the pantheon of Israel’s mythological leaders. Indeed, a segmentation of the preferences by age reveals that Ben-Gurion wins the most esteem among older age groups, whereas Rabin, and even more so Sharon, among the younger ones. A second—and not contradictory—explanation for Rabin’s relatively low rating (along with Sharon’s) is that the burning question he dealt with and that Sharon is dealing with today—relations with the Palestinians—is still at the heart of the Israeli public debate, unlike the challenges that confronted Ben-Gurion and Begin. There is a certain reinforcement of this explanation in the link between position on the Oslo process and assessment of Rabin’s leadership: among those who today support Oslo, 18% ranked Rabin as the best prime minister, while only 8% of the Oslo opponents did so. The Arab public, however, sees Rabin as the best prime minister—61%—with Begin and Sharon trailing far behind at 7% each, and Ben-Gurion, whom this public apparently holds responsible for the nakba, getting only 6%.

The most common view—43%—is that Israeli society was not changed by the Rabin assassination. Thirty percent think it was changed for the worse, and 16% for the better. Harsher views are found in the Arab sector, with 61% saying a change for the worse occurred, 25% that the situation has remained as it was, and 10% that things have improved. As for the extent to which the basic idea of the Oslo process—ceding territories for peace—is today part of the Israeli national consensus, 49% of the Jewish public think it is, compared to 42% who think otherwise. The Arab shows a clearer direction: 56.5% believe a territorial compromise is part of the consensus and only 10% do not (the rest have no clear opinion on the matter).

The Jewish public’s pessimism can apparently be ascribed to the state of affairs today, which leads an overwhelming majority of 74% to expect that even if Israel withdraws from all the territories beyond the Green Line and the occupation ends, Palestinian violence will not stop and may even intensify. Only 19% of the Jewish sector thinks ending the occupation and leaving the territories will bring an end to the violence. A segmentation of the responses by voting reveals that the view that ending the occupation will end Palestinian violence garners a majority of voters for Labor (52% vs. 37%) and Meretz (50% vs. 14%). But among voters for Likud, Mafdal (the National Religious Party), Shas, Torah Judaism, and the National Union there is a consensus (89%, 85%, 86%, 100%, and 87%, respectively) that ending the occupation would not cause a decline in Palestinian violence or would indeed increase it. Shinui voters are closer on this issue to the Right, with 67% saying an end to the occupation would not cause a drop in the violence and 30% saying it would. As expected, among the Arabs the majority—61%—believes that ending the occupation would bring an end to the Palestinian violence and only 16% think it would not (the rest have no opinion on the issue).

What of the situation today? Beyond the dominant view in the Jewish sector that ending the occupation will not prevent terror attacks, even with a majority (61%) believing that Abu Mazen would want to prevent the attacks but is unable to, 70% justify Sharon’s refusal to meet with him in the context of the worsening of relations. Moreover, the majority—60%—thinks that even if Hamas receives key positions following the coming PA elections, this will not moderate its opposition to Israel nor its involvement in terror attacks (28% think such a moderation in the organization’s positions would occur). At the same time, the public’s views are divided on whether, in such a case, Israel should or should not conduct negotiations with the PA, with 46% affirmative and 43% negative. A segmentation of these responses by voting reveals that among Meretz, Labor, and Shinui voters a majority (86%, 67%, and 56%, respectively) favors negotiating with the PA in such a case, while in the rest of the parties the majority opposes negotiations if Hamas holds positions in the PA.

Indexes:

General Oslo—39.6; Jews—36.6

General Negotiation—53.4; Jews—50.6

The Peace Index Project is conducted at the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Studies and the Evans Program for Conflict Resolution Research of Tel Aviv University, headed by Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann. The telephone interviews were conducted by the B. I. Cohen Institute of Tel Aviv University on October 31 and November 1, 2005, and included 585 interviewees who represent the adult Jewish and Arab population of Israel (including the territories and the kibbutzim). The sampling error for a sample of this size is about 4.5% in each direction.

Peace Index: September 2005

Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Hermann

Just before the New Year it emerges that according to the Jewish public’s annual balance sheet, Israel’s situation worsened this year in most areas for the society and the state, particularly in the areas of violence and crime, the gaps between rich and poor, and the functioning of the government and the political system. The only two domains where the annual balance is positive are Israel’s international standing and its security situation. In other words, the changes for the worse in Israel’s domestic situation are at the top of the public’s concerns.

About a month after the disengagement, a majority of the Jewish public thinks it was the right step both in terms of security and the chances of advancing the peace process. The majority also believes that the disengagement process itself showed the inner strength of Israeli society. These views presumably explain the finding that support for the disengagement today is higher than when it was winding up. As for an extensive evacuation of West Bank settlements, the majority’s position is that such a step must be carried out as part of an agreement with the Palestinians, with only a small minority prepared to support a further stage of unilateral disengagement. Indeed, a large majority favors holding negotiations with the Palestinian Authority despite the prevailing view that the chances of reaching an agreement with the Abu Mazen government are quite low. The gap between the support for negotiations and the skepticism about their results can be explained, among other things, by the widespread concern that without progress on the political level a third intifada is likely to erupt.

In the realm of domestic politics, the dominant view is that Sharon’s victory in the Likud Central Committee vote on advancing the primaries serves Israel’s vital interests. However, regarding the primary system itself, the public is divided between those who think it strengthens Israeli democracy and those who say it weakens it, with a small lead for the latter.

Those are the main findings of the Peace Index survey that was conducted on September 28-29, 2005.

At year’s end, the public’s balance sheet shows Israel faring worse compared to the previous year in nine of ten main areas for the society and the state. The balance is especially negative regarding violence and crime (82.5% think the situation deteriorated, 13% that it did not change, and 1% that it improved) and the gaps between rich and poor (82%—worsened, 12%—did not change, 3%—improved). In third place in the negative ranking is the functioning of the government and the political system, with a balance of 59%, 25%, and 7%, respectively, and after that the economic situation (52%, 21%, 24%). The balance was also negative, in this order, for Jewish-Arab and religious-secular relations, the internal strength of Israeli society, personal economic situation, and the chances of ending the conflict with the Palestinians. Only two issues showed an improvement: Israel’s international status (12%—changed for the worse, 21%—stayed the same, 59%—changed for the better) and its security situation (21%—changed for the worse, 36%—stayed the same, 38%—changed for the better). It appears, then, that in the public’s eyes Israel’s situation deteriorated, to one extent or another, in all the domestic areas that we checked, whereas on foreign and security issues it was only regarding the chances of peace with the Palestinians that things got worse this year, though to a relatively moderate extent (33.5%—the situation worsened, 26%—no change, 23.5%—the situation improved).

A more positive picture emerges regarding the Jewish public’s assessments of the results of the Gaza disengagement a month after it was carried out. Fifty-six percent say that in terms of its security effects it was the right step, with 36% saying it was mistaken (8% do not know). Also regarding the chances of advancing the peace process with the Palestinians, the rate of those who feel it was the right step (54%) is higher than of those who believe it was unwise (38%), and the rest do not know. As noted, in terms of the chances of ending the conflict, most people believe the situation deteriorated over the past year and did not improve. What resolves the apparent contradiction in the responses to the two questions is that the public views the disengagement as a step in the right direction for advancing the peace process, but as insufficient regarding the chances of ending the conflict. Indeed, only a minority (35%) of those who believe the disengagement was the right step in terms of advancing peace think the chances of ending the conflict improved over the year. Furthermore, over two-thirds currently believe that the chances of reaching a final agreement with the Abu Mazen government are moderately low or very low, while only one-fifth say they are moderately high or very high (the rest do not know).

A further positive view of the disengagement emerged in assessing what it says about the internal strength of Israeli society. Fifty-four percent believe the performance of the disengagement proved that Israeli society has moderately or very high internal strength, compared to 28% who say the opposite. At the same time, note the relatively high rate—18%—of the “don’t knows” on this question. In any case, the tendency to positively assess the effects of the disengagement and its implications for the strength of the country explains, apparently, the increase in support for it compared to the situation as it was being completed. According to the Peace Index for the end of August, the rates of supporters and opponents of the disengagement stood at 41.3% and 52.5%, respectively, whereas the same rates today are 59.4% and 33.3%.

However, even though the majority supports the disengagement, only a relatively small minority—19%—is now prepared for a similar, unilateral evacuation of West Bank settlements, whereas the majority is divided between those who support an evacuation only in the framework of a peace agreement with the Palestinians (38%) and those who do not favor such a step under any circumstances (35%), with the rest (8%) saying they do not know. Note that last month we found a similar pattern of positions on evacuating West Bank settlements, though the rates of support with (34%) and without an agreement (14%) have risen since then, while the number of opponents of an evacuation in any situation (42%) declined. In any case, when combining the supporters both of a unilateral evacuation and of one in the context of an agreement, it turns out that the basic support for a far-reaching dismantlement of West Bank settlements now comes to 57% of the Jewish public. This position is consistent with the broad support (about 70%) for holding negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. And this is true even though a similar majority (some 68%) believes, as noted, that the chances of reaching a permanent settlement with the Abu Mazen government are low. In other words, even among the skeptics there are many who think one should at least try, especially since, in the view of the majority (55%), a lack of progress on the political level means a third intifada may break out (30% do not think so and 15% do not know).

In the realm of domestic politics, the prevailing view is that Sharon’s victory in the Likud Central Committee vote on advancing the primaries serves Israel’s vital interests. Sixty-two percent hold this stance compared to 18% who think it would have been better for Sharon to lose (20% do not know). A segmentation of the responses by distinguishing between Likud voters and functionaries yields a reverse pattern: among Likud voters, the rate of those saying Sharon’s win serves the interests of the state comes to 65% while those saying the opposite is true amount to 19% (17% do not know). That is, the rate of those favoring Sharon’s victory among Likud voters is slightly higher than the average rate for the whole Jewish public. Among Likud functionaries, however, only 33% think Sharon’s win is good for the country and 50% believe a defeat would have been better (17% do not know). As for voters for the rest of the parties, the ranking of positive and negative assessments of Sharon’s victory is as follows (in parentheses—do not know): Labor—87% and 7% (6%); Meretz—81% and 0% (19%); Shinui—76% and 12% (12%); National Religious Party (Mafdal)—42% and 33% (25%); National Union—29% and 43% (29%); Shas—20% and 40% (40%); Torah Judaism—17% and 39% (44%).

On the background of the Likud Central Committee vote on advancing the date of the primaries, we checked whether the public believes the primary system practiced by the central committees of various parties strengthens or weakens Israeli democracy. It turns out that 34% think the system strengthens democracy, 41% feel that it weakens it, and 25% do not know. In other words, there is a certain tendency to oppose primaries, but the overall picture shows division and uncertainty about the system. Note, however, that the current positions on this issue are apparently influenced by the gloomy spectacle that emerged during the proceedings of the Likud Central Committee, especially the fiasco of the prime minister’s microphone being cut off at the beginning of his speech. Possibly, then, under different circumstances a different picture would have emerged on this question.

Indexes:

General Oslo—36.6; Jews—33.1

General Negotiation: General—52.3; Jews—49.9

The Peace Index Project is conducted at the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Studies and the Evans Program for Conflict Resolution Research of Tel Aviv University, headed by Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Tamar Herman. The telephone interviews were conducted by the B. I. Cohen Institute of Tel Aviv University on September 28-29, 2005, and included 582 interviewees who represent the adult Jewish and Arab population of Israel (including the territories and the kibbutzim). The sampling error for a sample of this size is about 4.5% in each direction.